Distributed negotiation schemes offer one approach to agreeing an allocation of resources among a set of individual agents. Such schemes attempt to agree a distribution via a sequence of locally agreed 'deals' -reallocations of resources among the agents -ending when the result satisfies some accepted criteria. Our aim in this article is to demonstrate that some natural decision questions arising in such settings can be computationally significantly harder than questions related to optimal clearing strategies in combinatorial auctions. In particular we prove that the problem of deciding whether it is possible to progress from a given initial allocation to some desired final allocation via a sequence of "rational" steps is PSPACE-complete. 
Introduction
The abstraction wherein a triple A, R, U represents sets of agents, resources, and "utility" functions by which individual agents associate values with resource subsets, has proven to be a useful mechanism in which to consider problems concerning how best to distribute a finite collection of items among a group of agents. In very informal terms, two general approaches have been the basis of algorithmic studies concerning how to organise the allocation of resources to agents. Centralised mechanisms of which combinatorial auction techniques are possibly the bestknown exemplar. In addition, distributed methods deriving from the contract-net model formulated by Smith [19] whose properties are the subject of the present article. In Combinatorial Auction schemes, e.g. [15, 16, 20, 21, 11, 12] , a centralised controlling agent (the "auctioneer") assumes responsibility for determining which agents receive which resources, basing its decisions on the bids submitted by individual agents. Bidding protocols vary in expressive complexity from those that simply allow an agent to submit a single bid of the form S, p expressing the fact that the agent is prepared to pay some price p in return for the subset S of R. More complex methods allow a number of different subsets to be described in separate bids, e.g. the so-called XOR language discussed in [15] . A typical aim of the auctioneer is to decide which bids to accept so as to maximise the overall price paid subject to at most one agent being granted any resource. This scheme gives rise to the Winner Determination Problem of deciding which bids among those submitted are successful. In its most general form Winner Determination is NP-hard, but there are a number of powerful heuristic approaches and winner determination can be efficiently carried out albeit if the bidding language is of very limited expressiveness. Despite the practical effectiveness of these approaches, there has, however, been a recent revival of interest in autonomous distributed negotiation schemes building on the pioneering study of these by Sandholm [13] . It is not difficult to identify motivations underpinning this renewed interest. For example, the implementation overheads in schema where significant numbers of bids (possibly having complex structures) are communicated to a single controlling agent; the potential difficulties that might arise in persuading an individual agent to assume the rôle and responsibilities of auctioneer and the need to ensure that bidding agents comply with the decisions made by the auctioneer. There are, in addition, the issues raised in deciding on a bidding protocol given the extremes from languages that are highly expressive to those which have very rigid and simple structures. The former are typically computationally hard for winner determination. The latter, while tractable, face the problem of no allocation at all being compatible with the bids received. Finally, aside from the computational problems with which the auctioneer is faced, there is the highly non-trivial issue for the agents bidding as regards selecting and pricing resource sets so as to optimise the likelihood of their "most preferred" bid being accepted.
Faced with such computational issues, notwithstanding the advances in combinatorial auction technology, environments whereby allocations are settled following a process of local improvements negotiated by agents agreeing changes, appear attractive. This is particularly so when the protocols for proposing and implementing resource transfers between agents limit the number of possibilities that individual agents may have to review.
The principal results of this paper establish that, far from resulting in a computationally more tractable regime or, indeed, even one that exhibits complexity "no worse" than the NP-hard status of winner determination, a number of natural decision questions concerning simple distributed negotiation protocols, have significantly greater complexity. In particular, we show that given a description of a resource allocation setting -A, R, U -together with some initial and desired allocations P (s) , P (t) deciding if the desired allocation can be realised by a sequence of rational "local" reallocations is PSPACE-complete. Thus, deciding if a particular type of negotiation will be effective in bringing about a reallocation is at a similar level of complexity to classical AI planning problems, e.g. as considered in the work of Bylander [1] . We, further, note one of our results resolves a question left open from Dunne et al. [6] : specifically we show the problem, of deciding if there is a rational sequence of "one-resource-at-a-time" reallocations to progress between given starting and final allocations, to be PSPACE-complete, improving upon the earlier NPhardness classification.
In the next section we introduce the formal structures of contract-net derived distributed negotiation reviewing the components of this presented by [13] together with the terminology and notation that will be used subsequently. Section 3 describes the decision questions that are considered, summarises related work concerning these, and presents a formal statement of the results subsequently proved in Section 5. Separating these two sections, we give a high-level, informal overview of the proof mechanisms in Section 4.
The problems analysed in Section 5 are concerned with what might be called "local" properties of a given allocation setting, specifically whether it is possible to progress from a given starting point to a desired allocation via a restricted class of negotiation primitives. In Section 6 we address "global" properties of such schemes which we term Convergence and Accessibility. The convergence problem, also studied in work of [7, 2] , considers a property of resource allocation settings using only a restricted class of deals. Namely, is the setting such that no matter what starting allocation is used and whichever sequence of allowed deals is followed, an optimal allocation will always be reached? Perhaps surprisingly, for the restricted deal classes under which the questions considered in Section 5 turn out to be PSPACE-complete, deciding convergence properties is "only" coNP-complete. Accessibility, considers whether from a given starting point there is at least one sequence of permitted deals that reaches an optimal outcome. This, too, turns out to be PSPACE-complete. We present concluding comments and discuss further developments in Section 7.
Resource allocation settings and local negotiation
The principal structure we consider in this paper is presented in the following definition.
Definition 1.
A resource allocation setting is defined by a triple A, R, U where A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n }; R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } are, respectively, a set of (at least two) agents and a collection of (non-shareable) resources. A utility function, u, is a mapping from subsets of R to rational values. Each agent A i ∈ A has associated with it a particular utility function u i , so that U is u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n . An allocation P of R to A is a partition P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n of R. The value u i (P i ) is called the utility of the resources assigned to A i . We use Π n,m to denote the set of all partitions of m resources among n agents: it is easy to see that |Π n,m | = n m , there being n different choices for the owner of each of the m resources.
Given some starting allocation, P ∈ Π n,m , individual agents may wish to "improve" this: for the purposes of this paper, the concept of an allocation Q improving upon an allocation P will be defined in purely quantitative terms. Even within these limits there are, of course, many different methods by which an allocation P may be quantitatively rated. For the settings considered in this paper we concentrate on the measure utilitarian social welfare, denoted σ u (P), which is simply the sum of the agents' utility functions for their allocated resources under P, i.e. σ u (P) = n i=1 u i (P i ). We next formalise the concepts of deal and contract path.
Definition 2. Let A, R, U be a resource allocation setting. A deal is a pair P, Q where P = P 1 , . . . , P n and Q = Q 1 , . . . , Q n are distinct partitions of R. The effect of implementing the deal P, Q is that the allocation of resources specified by P is replaced with that specified by Q. For a deal δ = P, Q , we use A δ to indicate the subset of A involved, i.e. A k ∈ A δ if and only if P k = Q k . Let δ = P, Q be a deal. A contract path for δ is a sequence of allocations
; P
; . . . ;
in which P = P (0) and
e. the number of deals in ∆.
Sandholm [13] presents a number of restrictions on the form that deals may take, one motivation for such being to limit the number of deals that a single agent may have to consider. The class of restricted deals presented in the following definition includes those analysed in [13, 14] .
Definition 3. Let δ = P, Q be a deal involving a reallocation of R among A.
a. δ is bilateral if |A δ | = 2. b. δ is t-bounded if δ is bilateral and the number of resources whose ownership changes after implementing δ is at most t. c. δ is a t-swap if δ is bilateral and for some s ≤ t, Q is formed by exactly s resources in P i being assigned to A j and replaced, in turn, by exactly s resources of P j .
The class of t-bounded and t-swap deals are simple extensions of the classes of O-contracts and S-contracts in [13] : O-contracts being 1-bounded deals and, similarly, S-contracts are 1-swap deals. We note that t-swap deals are a special case of (2t)-bounded deals. We introduce the concept of a deal being rational in the following definition. It will be useful to consider two forms: one linked to the particular quantitative measure of utilitarian social welfare; and, more generally, one which is expressed in terms of arbitrary quantitative measures. Definition 4. A deal P, Q is individually rational (IR) if and only if σ u (Q) > σ u (P).
The deal P, Q is said to cooperatively rational if for every i, u i (Q i ) ≥ u i (P i ) and there is at least one j for which u j (Q j ) > u j (P j ).
For A, R as before, an evaluation measure is a (total) mapping σ : Π n,m → Q. A deal P, Q is σ -rational if and only if σ (Q) > σ (P).
We note that δ is individually rational if and only if δ is σ u -rational. Where there is no ambiguity we will simply refer to a deal being rational without specifying σ .
Almost all of our development is in terms of individually rational deals. As we argue in Section 7, our results are easily modified to hold in the case of cooperatively rational deals.
It should be noted that the terms "individually rational" and "cooperatively rational" predate the current article, e.g. Sandholm [13] , Endriss et al. [8, 9] . The definition of "individually rational" is sometimes presented in terms of the existence of so-called payment functions with particular properties, e.g. [9, Defn. 13, p. 323] . Informally, such a function specifies an amount, p(i) that a i ∈ A δ pays ( p(i) > 0) or receives (− p(i) when p(i) < 0) if the deal is implemented. Thus, δ = P, Q is defined to be individually rational (in terms of payments), if there is a payment function for which a i ∈A δ p(i) = 0 and for each a i ∈ A δ , u i (Q i ) − u i (P i ) > p(i). With this sense of individually rational should an agent fail to increase its utility -u i (Q i ) ≤ u i (P i ) -there would still be an incentive for it to participate: the payment, − p(i), received would compensate. Similarly when a i increases its utility, although a positive payment will have to be contributed, this will be sufficiently small to leave a i with some profit. The utility gained, i.e. u i (Q i )−u i (P i ) exceeds p(i) the payment made. Although this definition of individually rational (in terms of payments) superficially appears rather different from that in Definition 4, it is well-known and easily shown that the two are equivalent. A deal P, Q is individually rational (in terms of payments) if and only if σ u (Q) > σ u (P) (the form used in Definition 4), see e.g. [9, Lemma 1, p. 324].
The notions of rationality introduced above are now extended in order to introduce the structures that form the main object of study in this paper: σ -rational paths.
Definition 5. For A, R and an evaluation measure, σ , a sequence of allocations
is a σ -rational contract path for the (σ -rational) deal
More generally, if Φ : Π n,m × Π n,m → { , ⊥}, is some predicate on deals, we say that ∆ is a Φ-path if Φ(P (i−1) , P (i) ) holds for each 1 ≤ i ≤ d. We say that Φ-deals are complete for σ -rationality if
∆ is a Φ-path for P, Q ).
Decision problems in localised negotiation
The ideas introduced in Definitions 3 and 4 combine to focus on deals that not only restrict their structure (in the sense of limiting the number of agents and the number of resources involved) but also add the further condition that a deal must result in a better allocation. It is as a result of such rationality conditions that significant difficulties arise within local negotiation approaches.
Notice that Definition 5 imposes a monotonicity condition on the sequence of allocations within, for example, 1-bounded σ -rational paths P (0)
; . . . ; P (d) : not only must P (i) , P (i+1) be realisable by moving exactly one resource, but also σ (P (i+1) ) > σ (P (i) ). Given that an agent is seeking to maximise its utility, why might such a monotonicity constraint be important? In other words, why would an agent be unprepared to accept a "short-term" loss when this will, eventually, be ameliorated? The detailed discussion of this question from [6, pp. 28-30 ] may be summarised as follows: the insistence on monotonically increasing σ (P (i) ) allows cautious agents to participate in negotiation. That is to say, without this constraint, an agent may reject a proposed deal under which it suffers a loss 1 (even though subsequent deals will change this) because it is uncertain whether any future proposal will make good its loss, or even be made at all. 2 The effects of combining structural and rationality conditions are already apparent in the following result from [13] . a. 1-bounded deals are complete for σ -rationality. b. IR 1-bounded deals are not complete for individual rationality. c. If |A| ≥ 3, then IR bilateral deals are not complete for individual rationality.
Fact 6 motivates a number of natural questions: Q1. Are there "reasonable" conditions that can be imposed on collections of utility functions, U, so that in settings A, R, U where these hold, IR 1-bounded deals are complete for individual rationality? Q2. Given A, R, U , P (s) , P (t) with P (s) , P (t) being IR, how efficiently can one determine whether there is a rational 1-bounded contract path for P (s) , P (t) ? Q3. When such a path does exist what can be proven regarding its properties, e.g. number of deals involved, etc.?
The first has been considered in [7, 2] and while these offer some positive results, the initial analyses regarding the other two questions presented in [4, 6] are rather less encouraging.
Fact 7.
a. Given A, R, U , P (s) , P (t) with P (s) , P (t) being IR, the problem of deciding if there is a rational 1-bounded contract path for P (s) , P (t) is NP-hard. (Dunne et al. [6, Thm. 12] ) b. For every m = |R| ≥ 7 there are choices of A, R, U , P (s) , P (t) for which: there is a unique IR 1-bounded contract path, ∆, for the IR deal P (s) , P (t) and |∆| = Ω (2 m ). (Dunne [4, Thm. 3] .) c. For every m = |R| ≥ 6 there are choices of A, R, U , P (s) , P (t) with |A| = 3 and for which: there is a unique IR bilateral contract path, ∆, for the IR deal P (s) , P (t) and |∆| = Ω (2 m/3 ). (Dunne [4, Thm. 6] .)
Slightly weaker exponential lower bounds for contract path length than those given in Fact 7(b) and (c), continue to hold even if each agent's utility function must be monotone, i.e. satisfy for all subsets S and T of R the condition
Although the analysis leading to the proof of Fact 7(a) is couched in terms of IR 1-bounded deals, it is straightforward to adapt it to establish NP-hardness for IR 1-swap deals. The principal contribution of the present article is in obtaining tight complexity classifications for these decision problems: Theorem 14 proving both to be PSPACE-complete.
We consider two general forms of decision problems in Section 5 where Φ in the description below is a predicate on deals.
Φ-PATH

E
Instance: A, R , σ, P (s) , P (t) with σ (P (t) ) > σ (P (s) ). Question: Is there a Φ-path ∆ for the deal P (s) , P (t) ? Φ-PATH U Instance: A, R, U , P (s) , P (t) with σ u (P (t) ) > σ u (P (s) ). Question: Is there a Φ-path ∆ for the deal P (s) , P (t) ?
Although, superficially, these are similar problems, the significant distinction that should be noted is that Φ-PATH U is a restricted special case of Φ-PATH E . We elaborate further on the differences in our overview of Section 4. The particular instantiations of Φ that we consider are the following.
(1) Φ E 1-bd,σ -R (P, Q): the predicate which holds if and only if P, Q is a σ -rational 1-bounded deal. We subsequently denote the resulting specialisation of Φ-PATH E by 1-PATH. (2) Φ U 1-sw,IR (P, Q): the predicate which holds if and only if P, Q is an IR 1-swap deal. We use 1-SWAP to denote the corresponding special case of Φ-PATH U . (3) Φ U 1-bd,IR (P, Q): the predicate which holds if and only if P, Q is an IR 1-bounded deal. Following the form used in [6] (in which an NP-hardness lower bound was obtained), we denote this special case of Φ-PATH U by IRO-PATH. Of the three decision problems considered, those defined by IRO-PATH and 1-SWAP have been considered in a number of practical settings. Thus, Sandholm [14] considers so-called "hill-climbing" heuristics built on 1-bounded contracts to identify optimal task allocations. 3 In Dunne et al. [5] t-bounded deals are used in modelling task allocation where the context is that of assigning sets of locations to be covered by individual agents in solving transportation problems.
We will show that each of the resulting decision problems is PSPACE-complete.
Overview of proof methods
This section has three aims: firstly, to address the technical question of how instances of the decision problems introduced at the conclusion of Section 3 are encoded; secondly, to elaborate on the differences between the forms Φ-PATH E and Φ-PATH U ; and, finally, to outline the organisation and structure of the proofs presented in Section 5.
Representing instances
In order to describe instances of Φ-PATH E or Φ-PATH U the problem of encoding functions whose domain is exponentially large in |R|, i.e. σ : Π n,m → Q; u i : 2 R → Q must be addressed. Of course, one approach would be simply to enumerate values using some ordering of the relevant domain. There are, however, at least two objections that can be made to such solutions: since the domains are exponentially large -n m and 2 m -exhaustive enumeration would in practical terms be infeasible even in the case of very simple functions, e.g. u(S) = 1 if |S| is even; u(S) = 2 otherwise. The second objection is that exhaustive enumeration schemes are liable to give misleading assessments of run-time complexity: an algorithm that is polynomial-time in the length of such an encoding, is actually of exponential complexity in terms of the numbers of agents and resources.
In [6] the following desiderata are proposed for encoding a utility function, u, as a sequence of bits ρ(u):
a. ρ(u) is 'concise' in the sense that the length, e.g. number of bits, used by ρ(u) to describe the utility function u within an instance is "comparable" with the time taken by an optimal program that computes the value of u(S). b. ρ(u) is 'verifiable', i.e. given some binary word, w, there is an efficient algorithm that can check whether w corresponds to ρ(u) for some u. c. ρ(u) is 'effective', i.e. given S ⊆ R, the value u(S) can be efficiently computed from the description ρ(u).
It is, in fact, possible to identify a representation form that satisfies all three of these criteria: we represent each member of U in a manner that does not require explicit enumeration of each subset of R and allows (a) to be met; uses a 'program' form whose syntactic correctness can be efficiently verified, hence satisfying (b); and for which termination in time linear in the program length is guaranteed, so meeting the condition set by (c). The class of programs employed are the so-called straight-line programs (SLP) which have a natural correspondence with combinational logic networks [3] . Definition 8. An (m, s)-combinational network C is a directed acylic graph in which there are m input nodes, Z m , labelled z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z m all of which have in-degree 0. In addition, C has s output nodes, called the result vector. These are labelled t s−1 , t s−2 , . . . , t 0 , and have out-degree 0. Every other node of C has in-degree at most 2 and out-degree at least 1. Each non-input node (gate) is associated with a Boolean operation of at most two arguments. 4 We use |C| to denote the number of gate nodes in C. Any Boolean instantiation of the input nodes to a = a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m ∈ 0, 1 m naturally induces a Boolean value, h(a) at each node h of C. If h is an input node associated with z i then h(a) = a i ; if h is associated with the operation ¬ and has as its single input a node g, i.e. g, h is an edge of C, then h(a) = ¬g(a). Finally if h is a gate associated with the operation θ whose inputs are nodes g 1 and g 2 (that is, g 1 , h , g 2 , h are edges of C) then the value h(a) is g 1 (a)θg 2 (a). Hence a induces some s-tuple t s−1 (a), . . . , t 0 (a) ∈ 0, 1 s at the result vector. For the (m, s)-combinational network C and a ∈ 0, 1 m , this s-tuple is denoted by C(a).
Although often considered as a model of parallel computation, (m, s)-combinational networks yield a simple form of sequential program -straight-line programs -as follows. Let C be an (m, s)-combinational network to be transformed to a straight-line program, SLP(C ), that will contain exactly m + |C| lines. Since C is directed and acyclic it may be topologically sorted, i.e. each gate, g, given a unique integer label τ (g) with 1 ≤ τ (g) ≤ |C| so that if g, h is an edge of C then τ (g) < τ (h). The line l i of SLP(C ) evaluates the input z i if 1 ≤ i ≤ m and the gate for which τ (g) = i − m if i > m. The gate labelling means that when g with inputs g 1 and g 2 is evaluated at l m+τ (g) since g i is either an input node or another gate its value will have been determined at l j with j < m + τ (g). Definition 9 provides a method of encoding utility functions u : 2 R → N ∪ {0} in instances of Φ-PATH U : each u i ∈ U is represented by a straight-line program, SLP(C u i ) derived from a suitable combinational network. For instances of Φ-PATH E , the function σ : Π n,m → N ∪ {0} can be encoded in a similar fashion. For example, via a (mn, s + 1)-combinational network, C, whose input z i, j indicates if r j ∈ P i ; val(C(α)) is again an s-bit value: the additional output bit being used to flag if the instantiation α is not a valid partition, e.g. if z i, j = 1 and z k, j = 1 for some r j and i = k. 5 A key property of encodings via SLPs is the following result of [10, 18] . It should be noted that the proof of Fact 10 is constructive, i.e. the translation is not merely an existence argument and, in addition, a suitable SLP can be built in time polynomial in T . Thus a further consequence is our subsequent reductions do not need to give explicit detailed constructions of SLPs. 6 It will suffice to specify σ or U for it to be apparent that these may be computed efficiently: Fact 10 then ensures suitable representations can be formed.
Distinctions between Φ-PATH
E and Φ-PATH U
We recall that Φ-PATH E concerns the existence of σ -rational Φ-paths with the evaluation measure, σ , forming part of the instance whereas Φ-PATH U focuses on the particular choice σ = σ u with the collection of utility functions forming part of the instance. Given that our primary interest is in the measure σ u , it may seem that there is some redundancy in considering Φ-PATH E , e.g. if we introduce utility functions for which u 2 = u 3 = · · · u n = 0, defining u 1 (S) as σ ( S, P 2 , P 3 , . . . , P n ), where P i is the particular subset of R held by A i in a specific case of A 1 holding S, then one has σ u (P) (in the "new" setting) equal to σ (P) (in the original form). The main objection to such an approach is that the utility function, u 1 , is likely to have allocative externalities, i.e. its value is dependent not only on the actual resources held by A 1 but also upon how the other resources are distributed. It has tended to be the normal assumption, often not even mentioned directly, 7 that utility functions do not have such externalities, e.g. [4, 6, 8, 13] . While the complexity classification of Φ-PATH E has some interest in itself, our main concern is with the decision problem relating to Φ-PATH U , which focuses on a single measure of how good an allocation is -σ u -and, in keeping with standard approaches, assumes utility functions to be free from externalities.
One point of some importance in our proofs concerning the variant of Φ-PATH E given in Section 5, is that the evaluation measure, σ , constructed in the instance A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) does not admit a direct translation to A, R, U, P (s) , P (t) in which U is externality-free and is such that σ u (P) = σ (P). We introduce a "coding trick" by means of which a general translation from any A, R, σ to a setting {A 1 , A 2 }, R , {u 1 , u 2 } results. In particular this translation provides the means by which two special cases of Φ-PATH U can be proven PSPACE-hard, i.e. the problems 1-SWAP and IRO-path.
Of course, in principle, our proofs that the special cases of Φ-PATH U are PSPACE-hard could be presented directly, i.e. without reference to Φ-PATH E and the coding device used. There are, however, a number of reasons why we avoid such an approach. The first of these is the technical complexity of the proofs themselves: although the translation 5 Although we describe the range of σ and u to be whole numbers using SLP encodings, it is a trivial matter to extend to integers, e.g. use an additional output bit to indicate whether a value is positive or negative; and to rationals, e.g. treat one section of the output bits as defining a numerator, the remaining section as a denominator.
6 Some illustrative constructions of SLPs in specific polynomial-time reductions are presented in [6, pp. 33-4] . 7 One of the few exceptions is [21] which explicitly states that the valuation functions considered are assumed to be free of allocative externalities.
from Φ-PATH E to Φ-PATH U turns out to be relatively straightforward; the central result that 1-PATH is PSPACEhard on which our subsequent classifications build, is rather more involved. We note that notwithstanding the use of arbitrary evaluation measures, the problem 1-PATH is a "natural" decision question whose properties, we contend, merit consideration in their own right.
Proof structure
We begin by recalling the decision problems considered.
1-PATH (special case of Φ-PATH E ) Instance: A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) with σ (P (t) ) > σ (P (s) ). Question: Is there a σ -rational 1-bounded path for P (s) , P (t) ?
1-SWAP (special case of Φ-PATH U ) Instance: A, R, U, P (s) , P (t) with σ u (P (t) ) > σ u (P (s) ). Question: Is there an IR 1-swap path for P (s) , P (t) ?
IRO-PATH (special case of Φ-PATH U ) Instance: A, R, U, P (s) , P (t) with σ u (P (t) ) > σ u (P (s) ). Question: Is there an IR 1-bounded path for P (s) , P (t) ?
Subject to Φ(P, Q) being decidable in PSPACE it is straightforward to show that Φ-PATH E ∈ PSPACE. For each of the problems listed, the corresponding Φ(P, Q) is decidable in (deterministic) polynomial-time.
On first inspection the approach taken to proving PSPACE-hardness may seen rather indirect: an "auxiliary problem" -Achievable Circuit Sequence (ACS) -is defined independently of the arena of multiagent negotiation contexts. The assertion "1-PATH is PSPACE-complete", is justified by showing "ACS is PSPACE-complete" (Theorem 12) and then ACS ≤ p 1-PATH (Theorem 13). This auxiliary problem has, however, two important properties. Firstly, it is "easy" to prove that ACS is PSPACE-complete using standard generic reduction techniques. 8 The second property of ACS is that its formal structure is very similar to that of 1-PATH.
Thus, ACS is concerned with deciding a property of a given (N , N )-combinational logic network, C, with respect to two distinct binary N -tuples. The N inputs of C are interpreted as a sequence of n data bits x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n coupled with a sequence of m value bits y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y m−1 ; the N outputs are viewed in a similar fashion. Now, suppose that a = data(a), value(a) and b = data(b), value(b) are the binary N -tuples given with C to form an instance of ACS.
Recall that val(y) is the whole number represented by the m value bits of C, i.e. val(y) = m−1 i=0 (2 i ) * y i , and define
Since the output of any (N , N )-combinational logic network on a given instantiation of its inputs is uniquely determined, the sequence [ data k (a), value k (a) ] k≥0 is well-defined and unique.
Informally, ACS asks of its instance C, a, b if there is some value t ≥ 1 with which:
Although the formal technical argument that ACS ≤ p 1-PATH given in Section 5.2 involves a number of notational complexities, its basic strategy is not difficult to describe. Recalling that an instance of ACS consists of an (n +m, n +m)-combinational logic network, C, together with instantiations x, y , z, w from 0, 1 n+m , the instance A C , R C , σ, P (s) , P (t) of 1-PATH that is formed uses 5 agents. The resource set R C contains disjoint sets each of size 2(n + m) -R V and R W -with "appropriate" subsets of R X (for X ∈ {V, W }) mapping to elements of 0, 1 n+m . In the initial allocation, P (s) , A 1 holds the subset of R V and the subset of R W that maps to x, y ∈ 0, 1 n+m . In the final allocation, P (t) , A 1 should hold the subsets of R V and R W that map to z, w . For the agents A 2 and A 3 : the former should hold subsets of R V while the latter holds subsets of R W . The evaluation measure, σ , is constructed so that any allocation, Q, for which
The main idea is to simulate the witnessing sequence { x i , y i } 0≤i≤t for a positive instance of ACS by a sequence of allocations to A 1 , i.e. from the initial allocation to A 1 which we recall mapped to x 0 , y 0 ∈ 0, 1 n+m subsequent allocations to A 1 will be those subsets of R V and R W which map to x i , y i ∈ 0, 1 n+m . The problem that arises in this simulation is that if Q (i) is the allocation in which A 1 's holding reflects x i , y i then the deal Q (i) , Q (i+1) although σ -rational for the evaluation measure constructed, will not be 1-bounded. In order to effect this deal, a sequence of 1-bounded σ -rational deals is used which involve the following stages:
1. a subset of R V is transferred one resource at a time from A 2 to A 4 ; 2. a subset of R V is transferred one resource at a time from A 1 to A 2 ; 3. the resources moved into A 4 in stage (1) are transferred to A 1 .
The subset of R V held by A 1 on completion will map to x i+1 , y i+1 , while the subset of R W continues to map to x i , y i . These three stages are then repeated, but now with resources from R W and the agent A 3 involved, so that the subset of R W held by A 1 will, on completion, map to x i+1 , y i+1 .
In order to track whether resources should be moved out of A 4 into A 1 , a "marker" resource, µ, initially held by A 5 is used: µ is reallocated to A 4 at the end of the second phase and returned to A 5 once the third stage is complete.
The notational overhead in the proof stems from specifying the evaluation measure, σ , in such a way that a σ -rational 1-bounded sequence of deals to go from P (s) to P (t) is possible if and only if the source instance of ACS should be accepted.
PSPACE-complete negotiation questions
We begin with the relatively straightforward proof that the decision problems we consider are all decidable by PSPACE algorithms. Since all of these are specialisations of Φ-PATH E and the predicate Φ(P, Q) is polynomial-time decidable for each, it suffices to prove,
Proof. Given an instance A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) of Φ-PATH E in which σ : Π n,m → Q is described in the form of a straight-line program, use a non-deterministic algorithm which proceeds as follows:
If a Φ-path realising P (s) , P (t) exists then this non-deterministic algorithm has a computation that will successfully identify it. The algorithm need only record the allocations P and Q occurring in the loop body and thus can be implemented in NPSPACE. The theorem now follows from Savitch's Theorem: NPSPACE = PSPACE, [17] .
The achievable circuit sequence problem (ACS)
The following decision problem is central to our subsequent argument. Achievable Circuit Sequence (ACS) Instance: (N , N )-combinational logic network, C, with N = n + m inputs X n , Y m and n + m outputs, Z n , W m ; x, y , z, w ∈ 0, 1 n+m .
Question: Is there a sequence
Proof. An instance C, x, y, z, w of ACS can be decided by a (deterministic) polynomial-space computation that iterates evaluating
(starting with x, y ).
This computation terminates either when val(y i+1 ) ≤ val(y i ) (the instance is rejected) or when z, w occurs with the former condition taking precedence when x i+1 , y i+1 = z, w . Since there are only 2 n+m possible cases, eventually one of these two termination conditions must arise. The whole computation can be accomplished in polynomial-space since only the current x i , y i need be remembered.
For PSPACE-hardness we use a generic reduction, i.e. given a Turing machine program, M, input s, and spacebound S = |s| c we form an instance of ACS that is accepted if and only if s is accepted by M within an S-space bounded computation. We may assume that M has a unique accepting configuration u. It suffices to note that from the description of M we can build a (t, t)-combinational logic network C M whose input bits encode configurations of M on exactly S tape-cells. For such a configuration, χ, C M (χ ) = π if and only if the configuration π follows in exactly one move of M from the configuration χ . Note we may use the convention that C M (u) = u for the unique accepting configuration. Combine C M with a p-bit counter, D, i.e. val(D(v)) = val(v) + 1 with p chosen large enough so that the total number of configurations of S-tape bounded configurations of M can be represented in p bits. 9 Now let s be the instantiation of the inputs of C M corresponding to the initial configuration of M on input s: s is accepted by M if and only if (C M , D), s, 0 p , u, 1 p is accepted as an instance of ACS.
ACS is polynomially-reducible to 1-PATH
It will be convenient to introduce the following notation and definitions. For V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n+m } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n+m } disjoint sets of n + m propositional variables, we define sets
In our subsequent notation, in order to avoid repetition, X refers to either of V or W . Given S ⊆ R, the subset S X is defined via S X = S ∩ R X . We define a partial mapping, β : 2 R → 0, 1 n+m as follows.
For all of the cases below, β(S) is undefined, i.e. β(S) = ⊥ whenever
S V = ∅ and S W = ∅ or S ⊆ R X and |S| = n + m or S ⊆ R X and there is some i for which {x i , ¬x i } ⊂ S.
For the remaining cases,
Given a = a 1 a 2 . . . a n+m ∈ 0, 1 n+m , there is a uniquely defined set S ⊆ R X for which β(S) = a. Thus we can introduce β −1
X as a total mapping from 0, 1 n+m to subsets from R X , as
For a ∈ 0, 1 n+m , we denote by val m (a) the whole number whose m bit binary representation is a n+1 a n+2 · · · a n+m , i.e the value n+m i=n+1 (a i ) * 2 n+m−i . Let S and T be subsets of R X that satisfy all the conditions (CS1)-(CS4).
For such sets S, T the composite set, S ⊗ T , is the subset of R X given by
T.
Now suppose that C is an (N , N )-combinational logic network with N = n + m, a ∈ 0, 1 n+m , and S ⊆ R X , is such that for each i, either x i ∈ S or ¬x i ∈ S. The difference set for S with respect to a is the subset of R X ,
The following lemma establishes some useful relationships between the composite set operation, ⊗, and difference sets. Lemma 1. Let C be an (n +m, n +m)-combinational logic network, a ∈ 0, 1 n+m , and, as in the notation introduced above, let R X denote {x 1 , . . . , x n+m , ¬x 1 , . . . , ¬x n+m }.
For every D ⊆ β
X (C(a)), the sets S and T defined by
have the following properties,
The final line following as
For (b), consider the set S ⊗ T . This is formed by first removing from S all elements in F = {x ∈ S : ¬x ∈ T } {¬x ∈ S : x ∈ T }.
We claim that this set comprises exactly those elements of the set D. To see this, first observe that F cannot contain any member of the set β
X (C(a)) and from the fact that T ⊆ β −1 X (C(a)) this precludes ¬x ∈ T . Without loss of generality, suppose for the sake of contradiction, that x ∈ D \ F -a similar argument applies if we assume instead ¬x ∈ D \ F. From the fact that
we have x ∈ β −1 X (a) and x ∈ β −1 X (C(a)). Since exactly one of x and ¬x must appear in β
X (a) = T and thus x ∈ F contradicting our assumption that x ∈ D \ F. It follows, therefore, that D ⊆ F and thus, recalling that
Having formed S \ F, the construction of S ⊗ T is completed by adding all elements in T , so that
as was claimed.
We now prove,
Proof. Noting that 1-PATH ∈ PSPACE the result will follow via Theorem 12 by showing ACS≤ p 1-PATH.
Thus given, C, x, y , z, w an instance of ACS we form A C , R C , σ, P (s) , P (t) for which
A C contains five agents,
Fix sets V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n+m } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n+m } so that the resource set in the instance of 1-PATH is,
Here µ is a "new" resource distinct from those in R V ∪ R W . For the source and destination allocations -P (s) and P (t) -we use,
To complete the construction, we need to specify σ .
Given Q ∈ Π 5,4(n+m)+1 , we will have σ (Q) ≥ 0 only if Q satisfies all of the following requirements:
Assuming that (B1) through (B6) hold, then σ (Q) ≥ 0 if and only if (at least) one of the following six conditions holds true 10 of Q.
One further requirement relating to (C3) is the following. Let f and g be the instantiations in 0, 1 n+m defined as
We write, C1(Q), C2(Q), etc. if Q satisfies C1, C2, and so on.
In the specification of σ given below, K mn ∈ N is a suitably large integer value depending on n + m. 12 For an allocation Q satisfying at least one 13 of these conditions, σ (Q) is
For any allocation, Q, in which none of these conditions holds, we set σ (Q) = −1.
We note, at this juncture, that σ (Q) can be evaluated in time polynomial in the number of bits required to encode the instance of ACS: firstly, given C, the relationship between Q V 1 , Q W 1 and Q 4 characterising each of the six conditions is easily checked, and the evaluation of σ (Q), given that one of these is satisfied, involves basic arithmetic operations, e.g. multiplication and addition, on values represented in O(m) bits. It follows, via Fact 10, that an appropriate SLP defining σ can be efficiently constructed.
We claim that C, x, y, z, w is accepted as an instance of ACS if and only if A C , R C , σ, P (s) , P (t) is accepted as an instance of 1-PATH.
Suppose that C, x, y, z, w ∈ L ACS and let
be the sequence of instantiations in 0, 1 n+m witnessing this. Consider the sequence of allocations
10 To avoid excessive repetition, when, for S ⊆ R V ∪ R W , we refer to β(S) in specifying any of these six conditions, it should be taken that β(S) = ⊥: should this fail to be the case then the condition in question is not satisfied. 11 By imposing this condition, which is not strictly necessary for the subsequent argument, we can simplify the analysis of one particular case in proving the correctness of the reduction. 12 Choosing K mn = 3(m + n) + 2 suffices for σ to have the properties needed in the subsequent proof and since this value is represented in O(log mn)-bits the polynomial-time computability of the reduction from ACS is unaffected. 13 Although, it is possible for Q to satisfy both of C1 and C2 or both of C4 and C5 in the cases where this arises the value that results for σ (Q) applying C1 (resp. C4) is the same as the value that results using C2 (resp. C5).
in which
For each of these, C1(Q (i) ) holds: when Q = Q (i) we have
So that the sequence of allocations Q (0) , Q (1) , . . . , Q ( p) is σ -rational. This sequence, however, is not 1-bounded, and so to complete the argument that positive instances of ACS yield positive instances of 1-PATH with the reduction described, we need to construct a 1-bounded, σ -rational sequence for each of the deals
Consider any Q (i) for some 0 ≤ i < p and the following sequences of 1-bounded deals starting with Q (i) .
S1. Using 1-bounded deals, transfer the set DIFF
))) from A 2 to A 4 , giving the allocation S (i),1 . Let T ( j) be the allocation resulting after exactly j resources have been moved from A 2 to A 4 , so that
)))|). Since the resources held by A 1 are unchanged by the deal T ( j−1) , T ( j) it follows that each of the allocations T ( j) satisfies C1. In addition, T (d) also satisfies C2. Each of these deals is σ -rational, since for 0 ≤ j ≤ d: σ (T ( j) ) = σ (T (0) ) + j. We observe that using C2 to evaluate T (d) returns,
since, from the fact that C1 holds, β(Q 
Again denote by T ( j) the allocation resulting after exactly j resources have been moved from A 1 to A 2 , with
Each of these allocations satisfies C2. To see this, first observe that the resources held by A 4 are unchanged by any of the deals T ( j−1) , T ( j) : throughout this stage A 4 holds
The subset of R V held by A 1 , initially β −1 V ( x i , y i ), is altered by transferring D to A 2 . This set of resources, however, is exactly β (C( x i , y i ) ), so that from Lemma 1(a), in the allocation T ( j) , the subsets of R V held by A 1 and A 4 have the respective forms,
Applying Lemma 1(b), β(G⊗H ) = C( x i , y i ), i.e. each of the allocations T ( j) satisfies the conditions specified in C2. Finally we have
It should be noted that, in S (i),2 we have
S3. Transfer the resource µ from A 5 to A 4 to give the allocation S (i), 3 . The allocation satisfies S (i),3 satisfies C3, and has
With the evaluation measure σ σ (S (i),2 ) = 2K mn val(y i ) + 2|β
The deal S (i),2 , S (i),3 is σ -rational since with val(y i+1 ) ≥ val(y i ) + 1 and K mn large enough,
S4. Using 1-bounded deals, transfer the set S from A 4 to A 1 , giving S (i),4 . Let T ( j) be the allocation resulting after exactly j resources have been moved from A 4 to A 1 , with
Noting that
we see that each of the allocations, T ( j) satisfies C3:
is σ -rational. For the allocation, S (i), 4 we have
S5. Transfer the resource µ from A 4 to A 5 giving S (i),5 . The allocation S (i),5 satisfies C4: )) from A 3 to A 4 , to give the allocation S (i), 6 . Let T ( j) be the allocation in place after exactly j resources have been transferred from A 3 to A 4 , so that
By similar arguments to those used when considering S1 above, we see that each of the allocations T ( j) satisfies C4. The allocation T (d) in addition satisfies C5. The deal
We, further note, that σ (T (d) ) when evaluated by using C4 is,
, x i+1 , y i+1 )|), and if evaluated using C5, Let T ( j) denote the allocation after exactly j resources have been transferred from A 1 to A 3 , so that T (0) = S (i), 6 and T (d) = S (i),7 with d = |D|. By a similar argument to that in S2,
Again via Lemma 1 and the analysis of S2 it follows that each allocation T ( j) satisfies C5. The deal
The last line following from the fact that from A 4 to A 1 , giving S (i), 9 . Letting T ( j) be the allocation after exactly j resources have been moved so that T (0) = S (i), 8 and
|, each T ( j) satisfies C6 and the deal T ( j−1) , T ( j) is σ -rational since σ (T ( j) ) = σ (T (0) ) + j. The allocation S (i),9 has S (i), 9 4 = {µ} so that, σ (S (i),9 ) = 2K mn val(y i+1 ) − 1. Furthermore, S (i),9 has β(S (i),9,V 1 ) = β(S (i),9,W 1 ) = x i+1 , y i+1 . S10. Transfer the resource µ from A 4 to A 5 giving S (i), 10 . This allocation satisfies C1 and, since σ (S (i),10 ) = 2K mn val(y i+1 ) the deal S (i),9 , S (i),10 is σ -rational.
To complete the argument that positive instances of ACS induce positive instances of 1-PATH in the reduction described, it suffices to note that the allocation S (i),10 is exactly that described by Q (i+1) . It remains only to prove that should A C , R C , σ, P (s) , P (t) describe a positive instance of 1-PATH then the instance C, x, y , z, w from which it arose described a positive instance of ACS.
Thus, let
; Q
; · · · ;
be a sequence of allocations for which a.
Given an allocation Q ∈ Π 5,4(n+m)+1 we say that Q has the assignment property if (C1(Q) holds and Q 4 = ∅) OR (C3(Q) holds and Q 4 = {µ}).
Consider the sub-sequence of Γ ,
; S (1) ; · · · ; S (d) such that every S ( j) in ∆ has the assignment property and if S ( j) , S ( j+1) correspond to allocations Q (i) , Q (i+k) in Γ then for every 1 ≤ t < k, the allocation Q (i+t) does not have the assignment property. Noting that P (s) and P (t) both have the assignment property, it is certainly the case that ∆ can be formed and will have S (0) = P (s) and S (d) = P (t) . Our aim is to use ∆ to extract the witnessing sequence of instantiations from 0, 1 n+m certifying C, x, y , z, w as a positive instance of ACS.
From ∆ we may define a sequence of pairs -a i ,
) and
). Since any allocation, Q, with the assignment property must satisfy either C1 or C3 it follows that β(Q V 1 ) and β(Q W 1 ) are both well-defined: if C1(Q) this is immediate from the specification of C1; if C3(Q) then since Q 4 must contain only the element µ it follows that Q V 4 = ∅ and, again, that β(Q V 1 ) is well-defined follows from the defining conditions for C3.
In order to extract the appropriate witnessing sequence for C, x, y , z, w ∈ L ACS it suffices to show that a i , b i behaves as follows:
if i > 0 and i is even.
For the sequence { a i , b i : 0 ≤ i ≤ d} defined from Γ = S (0) ; · · · S (d) consider the sequence of 1-bounded, σ -rational deals that realise the (σ -rational) deal S (0) , S (1) .
First observe that this must comprise three sequences -S (0) , T (1) , T (1) , T (2) , and T (2) , T (3) of 1-bounded, σ -rational deals implementing S (0) , T (1) with C1(T (1) ), C2(T (1) ), and T
(1)
with C3(T (2) ) and |T
4 | T (2) , S (1) with C3(S (1) ) and S
To see this 14 consider the allocations, P, such that S (0) , P is 1-bounded and σ -rational. Given that P must satisfy at least one of the conditions (C1) through (C6), and that C1(S (0) ) holds, we must have , C(b 0 )) or C1(P) will fail to hold. By similar arguments any 1-bounded, σ -rational continuation of P will eventually reach the allocation T (1) . In the same way, considering any allocation P for which T (1) , P is 1-bounded and σ -rational, it follows that T 4 . Eventually such transfers lead to the allocation T (2) described and, in the same way from T (2) to the allocation S (1) .
From C1(T (1) ) and C2(T (1) ) we have
).
From C3(T (2) ) we have
So that, in total, from C3(S (1) ) and S = ∅ we obtain
as required. In the same way, noting that C(a 0 ), b 0 = z, w , z, w , it cannot be the case that S (1) = S (d) . Thus, by similar arguments to those given above, we may identify further sequences -S (1) , T (3) , T (3) , T (4) and T (4) , S (2) -of σ -rational, 1-bounded deals that realise S (1) , S (2) . These have the form
with C4(T (3) ), C5(T (3) ), and T
with C6(T (4) ) and |T (2) with C1(S (2) ) and S
From C4(T (3) ) and C5(T (3) ) we have
From C6(T (4) ) we obtain,
Finally, C1(S (2) ) and S (2)
Thus, a 2 = a 1 and b 2 = C(b 1 ).
14 For ease of presentation we give only a brief outline of the argument here. The (somewhat tedious) fuller expansion of individual cases is provided in Appendix.
Thus the assertion regarding { a i , b i } 0≤i≤d follows by an identical analysis of the cases a 2 , b 2 , . . . , a 2 j , b 2 j , . . . .
We now easily obtain the witnessing sequence that C, x, y , z, w is a positive instance of ACS simply by using, a 0 , a 2 , . . . , a 2 j , . . . , a 2k where d = 2k. We have already seen that this satisfies a 2(i−1) ).
This sequence, however, must also satisfy val m (a 2i ) > val m (a 2(i−1) ): the deal S (2(i−1)) , S (2i) is σ -rational as it is realised during the 1-bounded, σ -rational implementation of P (s) , P (t) . From the definition of σ , recalling that C1(S (2i) ) and S (2i) 4 = ∅ we have
and hence σ (S (2i) ) > σ (S (2(i−1)) ) gives val m (a 2i ) > val m (a 2(i−1) ) as required. In summary we deduce that C, x, y , z, w is a positive instance of ACS if and only if A C , R C , σ, P (s) , P (t) is a positive instance of 1-PATH, thereby completing the argument that 1-PATH is PSPACE-complete.
Translating from evaluation measures to utilities
In this section we show how settings A, R, σ involving arbitrary evaluation measures, σ , may be translated in a general way to settings A, R , U with utility functions so that utilitarian social welfare (σ u ) in the translated context mirrors the evaluation measure (σ ) in the original setting.
Consider any A, R, σ with |A| = n, |R| = m and σ : Π n,m → Q, where it is assumed that for all P ∈ Π n,m , σ (P) ≥ −1. The resource translation We note that for any P ∈ Π n,m there is a uniquely defined S ⊆ R τ for which π(S) = P: we employ the notation π −1 (P) to refer to this S.
The concept of resource translation now allows us to prove.
Proof. In both results we use a reduction from 1-PATH. For (a), given A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) an instance of 1-PATH, consider the instance of 1-SWAP, B, R τ , U, Q (s) , Q (t) in which B = {B 1 , B 2 }, u 2 (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ R τ and
Since the instance of 1-SWAP has exactly two agents, any allocation Q 1 , Q 2 is completely determined by the subset of R τ allocated to B 1 . Thus, to complete the reduction we set Q (s) P (s) ) and, similarly, Q (t) 1 = π −1 (P (t) ). We claim that A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) is accepted as an instance of 1-PATH if and only if B, R τ , U, Q (s) , Q (t) is accepted as an instance of 1-SWAP.
Suppose the former is the case and let
be a witnessing rational 1-bounded path. First notice that, as u 2 (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ R τ , so σ u (Q) = u 1 (Q 1 ). It follows, therefore that
That is to say, the sequence of successive allocations,
to B 1 given by
yields an IR path. It is also the case, however, that the deal defined from π −1 (P (i−1) ), π −1 (P (i) ) is a 1-SWAP. To see this, recall that P (i−1) , P (i) is 1-bounded. Let {A j , A k } be the agents involved and r ∈ R be the resource transferred, without loss of generality, from A j to A k . Then,
so that the deal corresponding to π −1 (P (i−1) ), π −1 (P (i) ) is realised by exchanging r, A j ∈ Q
. We deduce that if A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) is accepted as an instance of 1-PATH then B, R τ , U, Q (s) , Q (t) is accepted as an instance of 1-SWAP. Now suppose that B, R τ , U, Q (s) , Q (t) is accepted as an instance of 1-SWAP, letting
be the sequence of successive allocations to B 1 witnessing this. Consider the sequence of allocations,
of R among A. It is certainly the case that for each Q (i) , π(Q 
Since π(Q (i)
1 ) = ⊥, we must have ∪ r,A ∈Q (i) 1 r = R, and thus r = r . It follows that the deal π(Q (i−1) ), π(Q (i) ) corresponds to a single resource, r , being transferred from A j to A k , i.e. this deal is 1-bounded. In consequence, if B, R τ , U, Q (s) , Q (t) is accepted as an instance of 1-SWAP then A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) is accepted as an instance of 1-PATH, completing the proof that 1-SWAP is PSPACE-complete.
For (b), we employ a similar approach: given an instance A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) of 1-PATH we form an instance B, R τ , U, Q (s) , Q (t) of IRO-PATH in which B = {B 1 , B 2 }, u 2 (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ R τ and u 1 (S) is now,
if |S| = |R| and π(S) = ⊥ 2σ (π(S)) if |S| = |R| and π(S) = ⊥ −2
if |S| > |R| + 1 −2
if |S| = |R| + 1 and for all r, A j ∈ S, π(S \ {r, A j }) = ⊥.
The only unspecified case is that of, |S| = |R| and with π(S \ { r, A j }) = ⊥ for some r, A j ∈ S. In this case,
To complete the construction we fix Q (s)
As before suppose that
witnesses to A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) as a positive instance of 1-PATH. The sequence of allocations to B 1 ,
with Q (i)
is IR by the argument used in part (a). Although this sequence is not 1-bounded we can, however, modify it as follows. From the proof of part (a), we know that the deal
be the resources swapped in order to form Q (i) . The deal Q (i−1) ), Q (i) may be implemented by,
This defines a sequence of 1-bounded deals implementing Q (i−1) , Q (i) . In addition \ { r, A }) = ⊥: one of these is r, A k ; the other being r, A j . From the premise that we have a positive instance of 1-PATH, it follows σ (P (i−1) ) < σ (P (i) ) so that
Thus, if A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) is a positive instance of 1-PATH then we can construct an IR 1-bounded path in the instance B, R τ , U, Q (s) , Q (t) of IRO-PATH. For the converse, given
establishing that B, R τ , U, Q (s) , Q (t) is accepted as an instance of IRO-PATH, it is easy to see that |Q 
By similar arguments used to those in part (a), from the fact that the deal Q 2( j−1) , Q (2 j) must be an IR 
is accepted as an instance of IRO-PATH then A, R, σ, P (s) , P (t) is a positive instance of 1-PATH, thus establishing that IRO-path is PSPACE-complete.
Convergence and accessibility
Our analyses of the preceding sections consider one effect of restricting agent negotiation methods. The main focus being on the complexity of deciding whether a particular reallocation may be achieved. As we noted in the introduction, such issues can be seen as addressing a rather localised property. In this section our aim is to consider two different questions, one -Convergence -of a rather more "global" nature, the other -Accessibility -falling in between the extremes represented by Convergence and the variants of Φ-PATH examined in Section 5. To clarify this point we now give formal definitions of the problems Φ-Convergence and Φ-Accessibility. In the same style used in defining Φ-PATH we give a version (for Φ-Accessibility) both in terms of evaluation measures and social welfare via specific utility functions. For the decision problem Φ-Convergence, however, only the utility form is used, it being possible to determine complexity bounds for this in a straightforward manner, i.e. without recourse to devices such as those used in the proof of Theorem 14.
Recall that Φ(P, Q) is a predicate on deals and that a sequence of allocations
is said to be a Φ-path for the deal
It is, of course, possible to choose Φ(P, Q) in such a way that maximal Φ-paths are not well-defined, e.g. consider Φ 1-bd (P, Q) the predicate which is true if and only if P, Q is 1-bounded. In this case, if Φ 1-bd (P, Q) = then Φ 1-bd (Q, P) = so that P; Q; P; Q; P; . . . is a (non-terminating) Φ 1-bd -path. For the instantiations of Φ(P, Q) we consider -specifically Φ E 1-bd,σ -R and Φ U 1-bd,IR -infinite length paths cannot occur. More generally, if Φ satisfies ∀P, Q Φ(P, Q) ⇒ σ (Q) > σ (P) then there are no infinite Φ-paths.
For a maximal Φ-path ∆ we use last(∆) to denote the final allocation of R that results, i.e. P (d) in the notation above.
Finally, for P ∈ Π n,m we denote by max Φ (P) the set max Φ (P) = {∆ : ∆ is a maximal Φ-path starting from P}.
For Φ ∈ {Φ U 1-bd,IR , Φ E 1-bd,σ -R } we note that max Φ (P) is never empty. If there is no allocation Q for which Φ(P, Q) holds then max Φ (P) = { P }, the path containing exactly one allocation. It is also the case, as shown in [4, Thm. 3, p. 50] , that there are example in which max Φ U 1-bd,IR (P) contains exactly one path ∆ with |∆| = Ω (2 m ).
Φ-Convergence (denoted by Φ-CONV)
Instance: A, R, U . Question: Is it the case that
Less formally, Φ-CONV asks whether an instance A, R, U has the following property. Given any initial allocation (P ∈ Π n,m ), is it the case that regardless of which Φ-path ∆ is followed, one will always reach an allocation last(∆) that maximises σ u ? Φ-Accessible E (denoted by Φ-ACC E ) Instance: A, R, σ and P ∈ Π n,m Question: Is it the case that
Φ-Accessible U (denoted by Φ-ACC U ) Instance: A, R, U and P ∈ Π n,m Question: Is it the case that
We consider the special cases defined from the predicates Φ E 1-bd,σ -R and Φ U 1-bd,IR introduced at the end of Section 3. In the specific cases of 1-bounded IR deals, both of these problems are of some practical interest: in settings yielding positive instances of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV, it is guaranteed that starting from any allocation and following any sequence of 1-bounded IR deals from this will eventually end with an optimal allocation. Similarly, in the case of positive instances of Φ U 1-bd,IR -ACC U , it will be known that some sequence of rational 1-bounded deals will lead to an optimal allocation.
Proof. To show Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV is in coNP, given A, R, U it suffices to test whether the following predicate is true of all pairs of allocations P, Q in Π n,m :
Certainly χ (P, Q) can be evaluated in deterministic polynomial-time since there are exactly m(n−1) 1-bounded deals consistent with P. To see this algorithm correctly decides instances of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV, suppose A, R, U should be accepted: then any allocation P ∈ Π n,m is either optimal (so χ (P, Q) always holds since the premise σ u (P) < σ u (Q) is always false) or (if sub-optimal) cannot be last(∆) on any maximal Φ U 1-bd,IR -path, i.e. there is at least one IR 1-bounded deal P, R available.
On the other hand, suppose the instance A, R, U should not be accepted. Then there is some maximal Φ U 1-bd,IRpath ∆, whose final allocation, last(∆) is sub-optimal. Since last(∆) is sub-optimal there is an allocation Q with σ u (last(∆)) < σ u (Q): as a result χ (last(∆), Q) = ⊥ and such instances would fail to be accepted.
To prove coNP-hardness we use a reduction from UNSAT, an instance of which is a 3-CNF formula
where
We say that a subset
is useful for ψ if |S| = n, S contains exactly one of each of the literals {x i , ¬x i }, and the instantiation formed by setting each literal in S to satisfies ψ.
We claim that ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is unsatisfiable if and only if A ψ , R ψ , U ψ is accepted as an instance of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV.
First observe that the allocation P opt = R ψ ; ∅ has σ u (P opt ) = 4n, and every other allocation, Q, has σ u (Q) < 4n. Thus to complete the proof, it suffices to show that ψ is unsatisfiable if and only if every maximal Φ U 1-bd,IR -path, ∆ within A ψ , R ψ , U ψ has last(∆) = P opt . Suppose ψ is unsatisfiable and consider any allocation S, R ψ \ S . Since ψ is unsatisfiable, it follows that u 1 (S) = 2|S| for every S ⊆ R ψ (since there are no subsets that are useful for ψ). Thus, the only IR 1-bounded deals possible must involve a transfer of a single literal held by a 2 to a 1 : any transfer from a 1 to a 2 reduces u 1 by exactly 2 while increasing u 2 by exactly one. It follows that any maximal Φ U 1-bd,IR -path, ∆, from S, R ψ \ S has last(∆) = R ψ , ∅ , i.e. if ψ is unsatisfiable then A ψ , R ψ , U ψ is accepted as an instance of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV. On the other hand, suppose that A ψ , R ψ , U ψ is accepted as an instance of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV. We show that ψ must be unsatisfiable. Assume the contrary, letting {y 1 , . . . , y n−1 , y n } be a set of n literals whose instantiation to satisfies ψ. Now consider the allocation P = {y 1 , . . . , y n−1 }; R ψ \ {y 1 , . . . , y n−1 } .
We have σ u (P) = 2n −2+n +1 = 3n −1. Consider the 1-bounded deal P, Q under which y n is transferred from a 2 to a 1 . For this, since the set {y 1 , . . . , y n−1 , y n } is useful we get σ u (Q) = 2n +1+n = 3n +1, so that P, Q is IR. Any subsequent 1-bounded deal Q, Q , will not, however, be IR: we have seen that this must involve a single resource transfer from a 2 to a 1 , but then σ u (Q ) = 2n + 2 + n − 1 = 3n + 1 with no increase in welfare, contradicting the premise that A ψ , R ψ , U ψ is accepted as an instance of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV. We deduce that the assumption that ψ is satisfiable cannot hold, i.e. if A ψ , R ψ , U ψ is accepted as an instance of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV. then ψ is unsatisfiable.
Thus, in contrast to IRO-PATH considered in Theorem 14(b), whose complexity is PSPACE-complete, the (superficially) more difficult question represented by Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV. is coNP-complete, i.e. under the usual assumptions significantly easier. This reduced complexity is easily accounted for by the properties of the predicate χ (P, Q) used in the proof. We note that χ (P, Q) is polynomial-time decidable by virtue of there being only a "small" (polynomially many) number of cases to consider, i.e. 1-bounded deals compatible with the allocation P. If, however, we consider Φ-CONV when Φ(P, Q) is such that there may be superpolynomially many Φ-deals compatible with any given P, then although we cannot guarantee coNP as an upper bound, provided that Φ(P, Q) itself is polynomial-time decidable, Φ-CONV is ("at worst") in Π p 2 , i.e. still somewhat easier than Φ-PATH. To see this, it suffices to note that the following predicate, χ (P, Q) is decidable by an NP algorithm:
Turning to the problem, Φ-ACC U , notice that we have the following progression
Problem
Number of allocations in Instance Complexity
Thus, in principle, we could hope that the classification of Φ U 1-bd,IR − ACC U is "closer" to that of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV In practice, as demonstrated in the following results, such hopes turn out to be ill-founded.
Proof. For membership in PSPACE, given A, R, σ , P we may use an NPSPACE algorithm, similar to that of Theorem 11, to choose last(∆), for some ∆ ∈ max Φ (P). We may then test, in PSPACE, whether σ (last(∆)) ≥ σ (Q) for every Q ∈ Π n,m accepting if and only if this is the case. Noting that NPSPACE = PSPACE completes the argument.
To establish Φ E 1-bd,σ -R -ACC E is PSPACE-hard, we show that ACS ≤ p Φ E 1-bd,σ -R -ACC E . Given an instance C, x, y , z, w of ACS we form an instance A C , R C , σ , P (C) of Φ E 1-bd,σ -R -ACC E . This instance is identical to that described in the proof of Theorem 13 except for the following details: P (C) = P (s) the source allocation in the construction of Theorem 13; σ is defined via
This modification ensures that the allocation, P (t) , in the proof of Theorem 13 is the unique allocation which maximises σ . We now have, by exactly the same argument, that an optimal allocation is accessible from P (C) if and only if C, x, y , z, w is a positive instance of ACS.
Proof. Immediate by applying the translation of Theorem 14(b) to instances of Φ E 1-bd,σ -R -ACC E .
Conclusions
The negotiation questions analysed in Theorem 14, consider environments in which agents may independently assess their resource holdings and attempt to obtain a "better" resource set by agreeing reallocations with other agents. In the most basic case, where only two agents are involved, extremely simple protocols 15 are sufficiently expressive to agree a partition of the resource set. Such schemes, even when limited to one resource at a time deals, are capable of achieving optimal (in the sense of maximising social welfare) allocations, provided that neither agent insists that given deals be IR. As we observed in the discussion opening Section 3, it is in the extreme case where rationality constraints are introduced, that significant problems arise with simple negotiation regimes. Some reallocations may be unrealisable, as demonstrated by [13] . Even if a particular reallocation can be realised by a sequence of 1-bounded rational deals, the number of deals involved may be exponentially larger than the number of 1-bounded deals required without the rationality condition imposed. Finally, deciding if such a sequence exists at all, a problem already known to be NP-hard from [6] , is, in fact, (under the standard assumptions) unlikely even to belong to NP: Theorem 14 (b) proving this decision problem to be PSPACE-complete. Although we do not develop the proofs in detail here, it is straightforward to demonstrate that this level of complexity is not a property limited to negotiations attempting to improve social welfare. For example, when the notion of P, Q being "rational" is that of "cooperative rationality", then deciding if P (s) , P (t) is realisable by a sequence of 1-bounded, cooperatively rational deals is also PSPACEcomplete. 16 To conclude we raise some open questions relating to the computational complexity of the decision problems addressed when alternative formalisms are used for representing utility functions. We have noted that the SLP representation is general enough to describe any set of utility functions and can do so via a program of length comparable to the run-time of an optimal algorithm to compute the function's value. A number of alternative representation approaches have been proposed. While these are not being completely general they are of interest as compact representations. In particular, [7, 2] introduced the class of k-additive functions as such a mechanism (Table 1) .
A function f : 2 R → Q is said to k-additive if there are constants
where I T (S) is the indicator function whose value is 1 if T ⊆ S and 0 otherwise. When k = O(1), i.e. a constant, k-additive functions may be represented by the O(m k ) values defining the characterising set of constants {α T }. It is, of course, the case that for any constant value of k, there will be functions Table 1 Complexity of negotiation properties for 2-additive utility functions
Problem
Proven complexity
that cannot be expressed in k-additive form. In the special case of k = 1, it is shown in [2] , that Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV is trivial: every system A, R, U in which each u i is 1-additive, is a priori a positive instance of Φ U 1-bd,IR -CONV. For k ≥ 2, however, the status of other decision problems is less clear. Thus, for k = 2, determining exact bounds for the accessibility and reachability problems when utility functions are 2-additive is likely to present significant problems. In particular, we have one unresolved issue which affects whether Φ U 1-bd,IR -PATH belongs to NP for this case. Thus, Dunne [4] , introduces the following measures related to Φ-paths.
• L opt (P, Q): the length of the shortest Φ-path realising P, Q .
• L max (A, R, U): the maximum value of L opt (P, Q) over those deals for which a Φ-path exists.
• ρ max (n, m): The maximum value (taken over all choices of utility function) of L max (A, R, U).
• ρ max C (n, m): As ρ max , but with the maximisation taken over utility functions belonging to some class C.
In the case of Φ U 1-bd,IR (P, Q), the function ρ max (2, m) is shown to be exponential in m, a result which For completeness we present in this appendix the case analysis concerning one aspect of the proof of Theorem 13. This arises in the argument that
In particular, given P ∈ Π 5,4(n+m)+1 satisfying at least one of the conditions (C1) through (C6) listed above, we precisely characterise those allocations, Q, for which P, Q is σ -rational and 1-bounded. We first note that P satisfies exactly one of the following:
f. C6(P).
(
As a second point, although A C has five agents and thus there are 20 possible choices for the combination of agent from whom a resource is transferred and to whom this resource is reallocated, in practice the 8 choices arising from 
need not be considered. If P satisfies the conditions described in (1) then a 1-bounded deal transferring a resource from A i to A j with A i , A j defined by (2) , results in an allocation that fails at least one of the conditions (B1)-(B6) presented in the proof 17 of Theorem 13. Given P satisfying (1), Table 2 characterises possible choices for Q such that P, Q is σ -rational and 1-bounded. We wish to show that if the instance of 1-PATH constructed from C, x, y , z, w is accepted then every 1-bounded, σ -rational path witnessing this must progress (from P = P (s) ) according to the sequence specified in Table 2 , where we note that P (s) satisfies C1(P (s) ) ∧ ¬C2(P (s) ).
For ease of reference we recall the conditions (B1)-(B6) and (C1)-(C6) which must be satisfied in order for P to have σ (P) ≥ 0
and µ ∈ Q 4 . Similarly, we recall that σ (Q) is given as,
with all other allocations having σ (Q) = −1.
17 We recall that σ (Q) ≥ 0 only if Q satisfies these six conditions.
We proceed by a case analysis of the different possibilities, where we use from(P) to denote the agent from which a resource is transferred, to(Q) for the agent receiving this resource in the 1-bounded deal P, Q , and r P ∈ R C to denote the featured resource. We note that it suffices to present the analysis with respect to lines (1)-(6) of Table 2 : lines (7) through (12) follow through a near identical argument.
Let P, Q be 1-bounded. Given the cases identified already in (2) we have the following.
Case 1: C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P) 1(a) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 2 If r P ∈ R W then Q fails to satisfy (B2), so we may assume r P = v ∈ P V 1 . Since C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P) holds, such a transfer will result in β(Q V 1 ) being ill-defined, a situation which is only allowed in (C2) and (C3): C3(Q) is ruled out since µ ∈ Q 4 ; C2(Q) requires β(Q V 1 ⊗ Q 4 ) to be well-defined and equal to C(β(Q W 1 )), but where this is the case then ¬v ∈ Q 4 = P 4 and hence P 4 = DIFF V (P V 1 , C(β(P W 1 ))), contradicting the assumption ¬C2(P).
In this case Q fails to satisfy (B6) with respect to the subset Q V 1 . 1(c) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 3 If r P ∈ P V 1 then Q fails (B3). If r P ∈ P W 1 then β(Q W 1 ) is ill-defined, a state only allowed with C6(Q) or C5(Q). The first cannot hold since µ ∈ P 4 . The second is impossible also: Q 4 = P 4 and therefore
For this case, Q fails to satisfy (B6) with respect to the subset Q W 1 . 1(e) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 4 If r P ∈ P V 1 then β(Q V 1 ) will be ill-defined and since µ ∈ Q 4 by virtue of the fact that C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P), the only possible condition that Q could satisfy is (C2), i.e.
). Let v = r P . If ¬v ∈ Q 4 then Q fails to meet condition (B6). It now follows, from C2(Q) that
contradicting the assumption ¬C2(P). If r P ∈ P W 1 then from the fact that C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P), β(Q W 1 ) will be ill-defined, and since µ ∈ P 4 the only possibility is that C5(Q) holds, and thus Q 4 = {r P } = DIFF W (Q W 1 , β(Q V 1 ): notice that P 4 must be empty (as is implied by Q 4 = {r P }), for otherwise Q would breach condition (B4) on account of Q V 4 = ∅ and Q W 4 = ∅. Comparing σ (P) with σ (Q) in this case, however, it is easily seen that P, Q cannot be σ -rational. Noting that P V 1 = Q V 1 and β(P V 1 ) = β(P W 1 ) we have,
In this case noting that P 4 ⊂ DIFF V (P V 1 , C(β(P W 1 ))), via Lemma 1(a) and C1(P) the resulting allocation would fail to satisfy (B6) with respect to the set Q V 1 . 1(g) from(P) = A 2 ; to(Q) = A 4 Discussed at the end of Case 1.
1(h) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 2 Given C1(P) ∧ ¬C2(P), C1(Q) can hold, however, P, Q cannot be σ -rational:
σ (P) = 2K mn val m (β(P V 1 )) + |P 4 | σ (Q) = 2K mn val m (β(P V 1 )) + |Q 4 | = 2K mn val m (β(P V 1 )) + |P 4 | − 1.
1(i) from(P) = A 3 ; to(Q) = A 4 If P 4 = ∅ then from C1(P), Q will fail condition (B4). Again, from C1(P) both β(P V 1 ) and β(P W 1 ) are well defined and, thus, the only option open for Q is that C4(Q). In this case, however, P, Q cannot be σ -rational: σ (P) = 2K mn val m (β(P V 1 )) σ (Q) ≤ 2K mn val m (β(P V 1 )) + |Q 4 | − 2 ≤ 2K mn val m (β(P V 1 )) − 1. 1(j) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 3 In this case, Q fails to satisfy (B3). 1(k) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 5 From the fact that µ ∈ P 4 , Q would breach (B5). 1(l) from(P) = A 5 ; to(Q) = A 4 The only options allowing µ ∈ Q 4 are C3(Q) and C6(Q). In the first of these it must be the case that Q V 4 = ∅ for otherwise β(Q V 1 ∪ Q V 4 ) is ill-defined. In this case, however, since Q 1 = P 1 , we get from C1(P) that β(P V 1 ) = β(P W 1 ) = C(β(P W 1 )). It now follows that P, Q is not σ -rational σ (P) = 2K mn val m (β(P W 1 )) σ (Q) = K mn val m (β(P W 1 )) + K mn val m (C(β(P W 1 ))) − |Q 4 | = 2K mn val m (β(P W 1 )) − 1. We are left only with Case 1(g) -from(P) = A 2 and to(Q) = A 4 -corresponding to the first two lines of Table 2 -and in order to preserve σ (Q) ≥ 0 the only choice available for r P is to as a member of the set DIFF V (P V 1 , C(β(P W 1 )))\ P 4 . Notice that, from ¬C2(P) this set is non-empty. We now have two possibilities for Q: C1(Q)∧¬C2(Q), arising when r P ∪ P 4 = Q 4 ⊂ DIFF V (P The first is line (1) of Table 2 ; the second corresponds to line (2).
Case 2: C2(P) 2(a) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 2 This is discussed at the end of Case 2. 2(b) from(P) = A 2 ; to(Q) = A 1 Although Q could satisfy (C2), the resulting deal would not be σ -rational: |Q V 1 | > |P V 1 and |Q 4 | = |P 4 |. 2(c) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 3 If r P ∈ P V 1 then Q fails condition (B3). If r P ∈ P W 1 , then β(Q W 1 ) is ill-defined. In this case, however, C6(Q) cannot hold (since µ ∈ P 4 ), and C5(Q) cannot hold: from C2(P), we have Q W 4 = ∅ and thus Q W 1 ⊗ Q W 4 is ill-defined also. 2(d) from(P) = A 3 ; to(Q) = A 1 From C2(P) is follows that β(P W 1 ) is well-defined, but this would fail to be the case for Q W 1 which would have size n + m + 1. 2(e) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 4 From C2(P) we have P 4 = DIFF V (P V 1 , C(β(P W 1 ))), thus to retain B6(Q) (with respect to Q 4 ) and B4(Q), would require r P ∈ β The resulting allocation, however, satisfies neither (C5) (µ ∈ Q 4 ) nor (C2) as Q 4 = DIFF V (Q V 1 , C(β(Q W 1 ))): Q must satisfy one of these as β(Q V 1 ), is ill-defined.
2(f) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 1 Similarly to 2(b), although Q could satisfy (C2), the resulting deal would not be σ -rational: |Q V 1 | > |P V 1 and |Q 4 | < |P 4 |. 2(g) from(P) = A 2 ; to(Q) = A 4 From C2(P), P 4 = DIFF V (P V 1 , C(β(P W 1 ))): since Q 4 = DIFF V (Q V 1 , C(β(Q W 1 ))), Q cannot satisfy any of (C1) through (C6). 2(h) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 2 The resulting allocation could satisfy C1(Q) ∧ ¬C2(Q) (if |P V 1 | = n + m), however, P, Q would not be σ -rational: σ (Q) = σ (P) − 1. 2(i) from(P) = A 3 ; to(Q) = A 4 If P 4 = ∅ then Q fails to satisfy (B4). Otherwise, from C2(P) we have DIFF V (P V 1 , C(β(P W 1 ))) = ∅, i.e. In this case, however, P V 1 = Q V 1 , P W 1 = Q W 1 and both β(P V 1 ) and β(P W 1 ) are well-defined and from
it follows that DIFF W (Q W 1 , β(Q V 1 )) = ∅ so that C4(Q) cannot hold. 2(j) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 3 If P 4 = ∅ then C2(P) would lead to Q failing to satisfy (B3). If P 4 = ∅ then no transfer from A 4 to A 3 is possible. 2(k) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 5 Since µ ∈ P 4 as a consequence of C2(P), any such transfer would result in Q failing to satisfy (B5).
2(l) from(P) = A 5 ; to(Q) = A 4 Dealt with below.
With the exception of Cases 2(a) and 2(l) each of the possible 1-bounded deals from P results in an allocation Q such that the deal P, Q fails to be σ -rational. For 2(a) -in which from(P) = A 1 and to(Q) = A 2 -we need only note that r P ∈ P V 1 (in order that (B2) is satisfied) and, for the conditions governing (C2) to continue to be true of Q, it must be the case that
Such a choice of r P is possible if and only if C2(P) with |P V 1 | > n + m − |P 4 1 |, i.e. exactly the preconditions relevant for line (3) of Table 2 . Case 2(l), with from(P) = A 5 and to(Q) = A 4 , has only r P = µ as an option. The resulting allocation, Q, given that C2(P) holds, will satisfy C3(Q) if and only if β(Q V 1 ∪ Q V 4 ) is well-defined and equal to C(β(Q W 1 )): this is possible only in the conditions prescribed by line (4) or Table 2 .
Case 3: C3(P)
We first recall the additional condition imposed in order that C3(P) holds. For f = β(P W 1 ) g = C(β(P W 1 )) val m (g) > val m ( f ). This is useful for dealing with Case 3(k).
3(a) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 2 As with previous cases, we must have r P ∈ P V 1 or B2(Q) fails. From C3(P), however, we still have µ ∈ Q 4 leaving only the option C3(Q): this, however, cannot hold since β(P V 1 ∪ P V 4 ) is well-defined but β(Q V 1 ∪ Q V 4 ) = β(P V 1 \ {r P } ∪ P V 4 ) is not. 3(b) from(P) = A 2 ; to(Q) = A 1 In the same way as the previous case, from µ ∈ Q 4 , β(Q V 1 ∪ Q V 4 ) will be ill-defined.
3(c) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 3 We may assume r P ∈ P W 1 (otherwise (B3) fails to hold). As a result we have µ ∈ Q 4 and β(Q W 1 ) ill-defined. From C3(P), Q W 4 = ∅, and so the resulting allocation is unable to satisfy (C6) the only option open.
3(d) from(P) = A 3 ; to(Q) = A 1 Again from C3(P), the instantiation β(P W 1 ) is well-defined: this will not be the case, however, for β(P W 1 ∪ {r P }), i.e. β(Q W 1 ).
3(e) from(P) = A 1 ; to(Q) = A 4 Although C3(Q) will hold, provided that r P ∈ P V 1 , the deal P, Q will not be σ -rational: |P 4 | < |Q 4 | thus σ (P) = σ (Q) + 1 using the evaluation condition for (C3). 3(f) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 1 Considered at the end of Case 3. 3(g) from(P) = A 2 ; to(Q) = A 4 Such a transfer will result in β(Q V 1 ∪ Q V 4 ) being ill-defined.
3(h) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 2 Similarly, such a transfer results in β(Q V 1 ∪ Q V 4 ) being ill-defined.
3(i) from(P) = A 3 ; to(Q) = A 4 From C3(P) it holds that µ ∈ Q 4 : if Q 4 = {µ} then (B6) fails to hold with respect to Q 4 ; on the other hand, if Q V 4 = ∅, then β(Q W 1 ∪ Q W 4 ) is ill-defined thereby preventing the option C6(Q) from the fact that β(P W 1 ) is well-defined. 3(j) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 3 Any choice of r P ∈ P 4 results in Q 3 not satisfying (B3). 3(k) from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 5 Considered below. 3(l) from(P) = A 5 ; to(Q) = A 4 Given C3(P) we have P 5 = ∅ and thus no such transfer is possible.
The remaining two cases are 3(f) (from(P) = A 4 , to(Q) = A 1 ) and 3(k) (from(P) = A 4 ; to(Q) = A 5 ). In the first of these, given that r P = µ (condition (B1) must hold for Q), we have the case described by line (5) of Table 2 . In the second, from (B5) the only choice is r P = µ. If it is the case that Q 4 = ∅, then the resulting allocation, Q, would satisfy (C2): now recalling that C3(P) enforces, val m (C(β(P W 1 ))) > val m (β(P W 1 )) were it the case that Q 4 = ∅ and C2(Q) the deal P, Q would not be σ -rational, σ (Q) ≤ 2K mn val m (β(Q W 1 )) + |Q 4 | + n + m = 2K mn val m (β(P W 1 )) + |P 4 | − 1 + n + m < K mn val m (β(P W 1 )) + K mn val m (C(β(P W 1 ))) − |P 4 | = σ (P).
